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INSANE IN THE MEMBRANE: ARGUING AGAINST THE 
FORCIBLE MEDICATION OF MENTALLY ILL  
PRE-TRIAL DEFENDANTS 
 
Tobias Schad* 
 
 
Our nation’s mental illness epidemic has wreaked havoc on the 
lives of millions of families across the socio-economic spectrum, 
and has spawned an industry devoted to developing anti-psychotic 
drugs to combat these cognitive diseases. While mental illness per-
vades all strata of American society, it is particularly widespread 
among criminal defendants. The Government’s practice of forcibly 
administering antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants in order 
to render them competent for trial places these defendants’ consti-
tutional rights at serious risk. In 2003, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld this controversial practice in its landmark decision 
Sell v. United States. 
This Note argues that Sell was decided at a time in which the 
dangers of antipsychotic drugs were poorly understood, and thus 
fails to properly balance the rights of criminal defendants with the 
Government’s desire for prosecution. The Court should not have 
overturned its precedent, which required evidence that the defend-
ant posed a danger to himself or others before the Government 
could forcibly medicate him and thus strip him of his right to bodi-
ly autonomy. Sell also left lower courts with an unworkable test 
regarding when forcible medication should be allowed, which has 
led to an increase in the number of defendants who are forcibly 
medicated. 
 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 
2011. Many thanks to the entire Journal staff for their thoughtful editing and 
hard work. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their support, 
patience and encouragement. 
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What this case really gets down to is whether we are 
going to allow our courts, for any reason, to conjure 
a chemically-induced form of synthetic sanity in an 
incompetent accused by forcing the accused to put 
unwanted, mind-altering drugs in her or his brain. 
For my part, I think it is a violation of the due 
process clause of our state constitution to force 
drugs upon a person just because the person is 
accused of a crime, and we want to be done with it.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States is in the midst of a crisis as millions of 
Americans, from all walks of life, cope with mental illness.2 In 
2005, about one in four Americans suffered from a “diagnosable 
mental disorder.”3 The number of Americans deemed disabled for 
the purposes of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) grew by almost 250% 
between 1987 and 2007.4 The alarming rise of these disorders has 
                                                            
1 Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J., dissenting). 
2 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Mental Health: A Report of 
the Surgeon General, NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INST. HEALTH (1999), 
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf; Depression in Older Persons Fact 
Sheet, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (October 2009), 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness&template=/ContentMa
nagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=7515 (“Depression affects more 
than 6.5 million of the 35 million Americans aged 65 years or older.”). 
3 Mental Illness Statistics, THE KIM FOUND., http://www. 
thekimfoundation.org/html/about_mental_ill/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2014) (“An estimated 26.2 percent of Americans ages 18 and older or about one 
in four adults suffer from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year. When 
applied to the 2004 U.S. Census residential population estimate for ages 18 and 
older, this figure translates to 57.7 million people.”). 
4 Marcia Angell, The Epidemic of Mental Illness: Why?, THE NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jun. 23, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
archives/2011/jun/23/epidemic-mental-illness-why/?page=1 (“The tally of those 
who are so disabled by mental disorders that they qualify for Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) increased 
nearly two and a half times between 1987 and 2007—from one in 184 
Americans to one in seventy-six. For children, the rise is even more startling—a 
thirty-five-fold increase in the same two decades.”). As a point of reference, the 
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led many institutions to rethink the way they interact with people 
who suffer from mental illness: both our nation’s education system 
and many private employers have improved relations with their 
mentally ill constituents.5 Despite their illnesses—and especially 
because of their illnesses—these Americans deserve to be afforded 
the same rights as their unimpaired fellow citizens. 
The criminal justice system leaves mentally ill persons 
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. Judicial 
safeguarding of those who suffer from mental illness is crucial 
because criminal defendants suffer from mental illness at a much 
higher rate compared to the general population.6 Furthermore, 
defendants who suffer from mental illness are significantly more 
likely to be jailed than hospitalized—a decision that often rests in 
the hands of judges.7 A Department of Justice investigation found 
                                                            
entire U.S. population increased around 30% during this same time period. US 
Population by Year, MULTPL, (2014), http://www.multpl.com/united-states-
population/table. 
5 Guidelines For School Assemblies on Mental Health Awareness, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, http://www.nasponline.org/resources/ 
mental-health/mental-health-assemblies.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (“Our 
goals in promoting school-based assemblies on mental health are to . . . educate 
students and teachers about mental health and mental illness.”); National 
Disability Employment Awareness Month - October 2013, GOGEBIC 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.gccmh.org/?p=498 
(“Held each October, National Disability Employment Awareness Month . . . is 
a national campaign that raises awareness about disability employment issues 
and celebrates the many and varied contributions of America’s workers with 
disabilities.”). 
6 See A Guide to Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System: A Systems 
Guide for Families and Consumers, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/Issues_Spotlights/ 
Criminaliztion/Guide_to_Mental_Illness_and_the_Criminal_Justice_System.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (“Among the general population in the United States, 
only 2.8 percent of adults have a serious mental illness. However, among the 
population in U.S. jails, 7.2 percent have a serious mental illness.”). 
7 Karen J. Cusack et al., Criminal Justice Involvement, Behavioral Health 
Service Use, and Costs of Forensic Assertive Community Treatment: A 
Randomized Trial, 46:4 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 356, 356 (2010), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2895013 
(“Individuals displaying symptoms characteristic of mental illness were found to 
have a 67% higher probability of being arrested than individuals not displaying 
such symptoms.”). 
354 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that “[o]ver half of inmates with mental health problems never 
received treatment prior to incarceration.”8 This pervasive lack of 
treatment is due in part to the $4.35 billion reduction in mental 
illness funds among state budgets from 2011 through 2013.9  
The staggering numbers of untreated mentally ill defendants 
present enormous challenges for the judicial system. On the one 
hand, courts are obligated to sanction defendants when the law so 
demands. However, the judiciary is also tasked with protecting the 
constitutional rights of those who suffer from mental illness as they 
move through the criminal justice system. While the violation of 
constitutional rights is a concern for all defendants, the mentally ill 
are especially vulnerable given their cognitive deficiencies and the 
terrifying possibility of forcible medication.  
Just over ten years ago in Sell v. United States,10 the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to enhance judicial protection of criminal 
defendants afflicted with mental disorders. Sell centered on 
whether the government could force Dr. Charles Sell, a pre-trial 
detainee defendant, to ingest antipsychotic drugs after he had once 
before been deemed incompetent to stand trial.11 Dr. Sell had first 
appealed to a magistrate to overturn the order requiring him to be 
forcibly medicated.12 His appeal eventually went up to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that while “the evidence does 
                                                            
8 Alana Horowitz, Mental Illness Soars In Prisons, Jails While Inmates 
Suffer, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 4, 2013 3:33 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/mental-illness-prisons-jails-inmates_n_ 
2610062.html; Inmate Mental Health, NAT’L INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1DOJ.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).   
9 Horowitz, supra note 8 (“In the past three years, $4.35 billion in funding 
for mental health services has been cut from state budgets across the nation, 
according to a recent report. Because of the cuts, treatment centers have had to 
trim services and turn away patients.”); Robert W. Glover et al., Proceeding on 
the State Budget Crisis and the Behavioral Health Treatment Gap: The Impact 
on Public Substance Abuse and Mental Health Treatment Systems, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS (Mar. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.nasmhpd.org/docs/Policy/ 
SummaryCongressional%20Briefing_2012.pdf. 
10 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
11 Id. at 169–71. 
12 Sell v. United States. No. 4:97 CR 290 DJS, 4:98 CR 177 DJS, 2001 WL 
35838455, at *1 (E.D. Mo. April 4, 2001). 
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not support a finding that Sell posed a danger to himself or others,” 
the order mandating medication was sound.13 Thus, absent a 
finding that he was a safety risk, the government’s motivation for 
forcing Dr. Sell to ingest these antipsychotic drugs was to ensure 
that he might regain his competency in order to stand trial.14 
The case then came before the Supreme Court, which ruled that 
the government’s use of forcible medication to render a pre-trial 
defendant mentally competent is constitutional as long as the trial 
court finds that: (1) there are “important governmental interests at 
stake”;15 (2) “administration of the [involuntary medication] is 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand 
trial . . . [and] substantially unlikely to have side effects that 
will . . . render the trial unfair”;16 (3) “any alternative, less intrusive 
treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results” as 
the forcible medication must be “necessary to further the 
government interests”;17 and (4) the antipsychotic drugs are 
“medically appropriate . . . [and] in the patient’s best medical 
interest.”18 
When the government decides to forcibly medicate a criminal 
defendant who suffers from mental illness, the defendant’s 
Constitutional rights clash with the government’s interest in 
prosecution. Constitutional rights are of utmost concern for all 
defendants, but mentally ill defendants are at an even greater risk 
due to the possibility that they may be forcibly medicated with 
antipsychotics. The mentally ill defendant’s rights include the right 
to a fair trial,19 the right to bodily integrity,20 and the right to make 
certain decisions fundamental to his or her liberty.21 Forcible 
                                                            
13 United States v. Sell 282 F.3d 560, 565, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) vacated, 539 
U.S. 166 (2003).  
14 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
15 Id. at 180.  
16 Id. at 181. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
20 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). 
21 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990) 
(holding that people have a liberty interest in making some decisions free from 
governmental intrusion); Ramie v. Hedwig Vill., Tex., 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th 
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medication is likely to jeopardize these rights in two ways: first, 
the pronounced side effects that often accompany the 
administration of antipsychotic drugs make a defendant incoherent, 
and effectively incapable of making decisions; and second, the 
unreliability of the drugs makes them woefully ineffective in 
producing the state’s desired outcome (i.e., restoring the 
defendant’s competency to stand trial). Moreover, irrespective of 
the drugs’ side effects or efficacy, the act itself of forcing these 
drugs into the defendant’s body is a constitutional violation.  
Sell presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to advise 
and guide trial courts on how to properly balance the rights of the 
exorbitant number of criminal defendants who suffer from mental 
illness22 with the interests of the government. Unfortunately for 
millions of mentally ill defendants, the Supreme Court let this 
opportunity pass them by and left these defendants even more 
vulnerable to constitutional violations.  
In anticipation of the Sell decision, both the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) submitted briefs imploring 
the Court to give proper weight to Dr. Sell’s constitutional rights as 
a mentally ill defendant.23 Specifically, the ACLU focused on Dr. 
Sell’s “liberty interest in bodily integrity,” while the NADCL’s 
brief centered on the effects of the drugs on Sell’s ability to present 
an effective defense.24 The Court did provide some protection to 
                                                            
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he liberty interest in privacy encompasses . . . the freedom to 
make certain kinds of decisions without government interference.”). 
22 Grading the States 2009: A Report on America’s Health Care System for 
Adults with Serious Mental Illness, NAT’L ALLIANCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS 42, 
http://www.namiga.org/GTS/Full%20Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2014 Sep. 
23, 2014) [hereinafter Grading the States] (“[M]ore than 450,000 Americans 
with a recent history of mental illness are incarcerated in U.S. jails and 
prisons.”). 
23 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union Of Eastern Missouri as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 
02–5664), 2002 WL 31898296 [hereinafter “ACLU Brief, Sell v. United 
States”]; Brief of The National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166 
(2003) (No. 02–5664), 2002 WL 31898312 [hereinafter “NADCL Brief, Sell v. 
United States”].  
24 ACLU Brief, Sell v. United States, supra note 23, at *3; NADCL Brief, 
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criminal defendants afflicted with mental illness by setting a four-
factor test, all of which must be met before the government can 
forcibly administer antipsychotic medication.25 The 
abovementioned four-factor test may seem like a high bar, but the 
Court ultimately ratified the government’s power to forcibly 
medicate non-violent, mentally ill criminal defendants. 
 The Court failed to afford adequate weight to a mentally ill 
defendant’s right to make significant personal decisions,26 and his 
right to bodily integrity.27 The Court also failed to adequately 
address the effect of these antipsychotics on a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a fair trial.28 Had the Court properly 
accounted for the true risk of the drugs’ inefficacy,29 their 
potentially destructive side effects, and the inherent personal 
invasion associated with forcible medication, it likely would have 
concluded that the government’s sole interest in a trial is never 
enough to forcibly medicate non-dangerous, pre-trial defendants.30 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sell is 
based on a misleading picture of drugs that have since been proven 
ineffective and dangerous, failed to properly balance rights, and 
provided courts with an unworkable test. Ultimately, defendants 
                                                            
Sell v. United States, supra note 23, at *2.  
25 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81. 
26 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342–43 (upholding the right of a patient in 
a persistent vegetative state to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment on the 
grounds that “[t]he sanctity, and individual privacy, of the human body is 
obviously fundamental to liberty”). But see Ramie, 765 F.2d at 492 (dismissing 
a civil rights action brought against police officers who questioned a suspect 
about her gender because gender is “generally not such [an] intimate matter”). 
27 Cf., e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 847–49 (1992) (cataloging cases in which substantive due process 
rights have been recognized).   
28 Cf., e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (holding that 
the Due Process Clause guarantees “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”). 
29 See, e.g., Jeffrey Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs 
in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1209 
(2005). 
30 Anne Harding, Antipsychotic Drugs Linked to Sudden Cardiac Death, 
CNN (Jan. 15, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/01/ 
15/healthmag.antipsychotic.sudden.death. 
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who have not been deemed a danger to themselves or anyone in 
their facility should not be medicated with antipsychotics against 
their will. Part I of this Note examines how antipsychotic drugs 
have been used in the United States since their introduction several 
decades ago. Part II gives a brief background of the law regarding 
competency. Part III explains why forcible medication violates a 
defendant’s fundamental liberty interest in bodily autonomy, along 
with her constitutional right to a fair trial. Part IV dissects the 
Government’s interest in forcibly medicating pre-trial detainees 
and argues that the government’s sole interest in a trial is never 
important enough to outweigh the defendant’s constitutional rights. 
Part V focuses on an analysis of the issues with which trial courts 
have been confronted in the wake of Sell, specifically the lack of 
clarity the Sell test has afforded lower courts. Part VI concludes, 
with a hope that the Supreme Court revisits this troubled opinion.  
 
I.      EVOLUTION OF ANTIPSYCHOTICS  
 
The term “antipsychotic” covers a wide range of drugs, each 
with its own side effects and levels of efficacy.31 Due to a 
multitude of factors—the insurance industry’s inadequate coverage 
of other forms of mental illness,32 a dearth of effective mental 
health facilities,33 and the political power of Big Pharma34 to name 
                                                            
31 Antipsychotics, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.Merriam-Webster.Com/ 
Medlineplus/ANTIPSYCHOTICS  (last visited Oct. 8, 2014); see also Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (employing a similar definition). 
Antipsychotics differ from antidepressants as the former is used to “block 
specific dopamine receptors in the brain” while the latter is used to treat 
depression. Psychotropic Drugs: What Are They, ABCNEWS, 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2011/12/02/what-you-need-to-know-about-
psychotropic-drugs/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
32 Gennyfer Johnson, The Stigma Of Mental Illness and How it Directly 
Relates to The Lack of Insurance Equity Coverage 1 (Nov. 14, 2009) 
(unpublished seminar paper, University of Wisconsin-Platteville) (on file with 
Journal of Law and Policy) (“Mental illness is often seen as a fabricated disease, 
and is rarely treated in accordance with procedure for other major illnesses; such 
as heart disease, diabetes or cancer.”). 
33 See Grading the States, supra note 22, at 44 (“Across the states, this 
report finds that there are not enough services and supports for those who need 
them. Further, the services that are provided are neither routinely comprehensive 
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a few—the most common method of treating mental illness is 
through the administration of antipsychotic drugs.35 The 
development of antipsychotics has certainly been an improvement 
over the highly intrusive, draconian methods popular in the 
beginning of the 20th century.36 However, this modest 
improvement is not a cause for celebration. The government’s 
forcible administration of these drugs to mentally ill criminal 
defendants only adds another layer of inhumanity to an already 
questionable method of treatment.37  
Antipsychotics fall into two general categories: first-generation 
(conventional) and second-generation (atypical).38 First-generation 
antipsychotics rose to popularity in the 1950s and have been 
                                                            
in scope nor provably effective.”).  
34 See Alison Bass, The Troubling Link Between Big Pharma and the 
American Psychiatric Association, THE FASTER TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://thefastertimes.com/healthinvestigations/2010/03/30/the-troubling-link-
between-big-pharma-and-the-american-psychiatric-association  (“[T]he National 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), the most powerful advocacy group for 
people with mental illness, received millions of dollars in funding from drug 
companies for years- a payola that no doubt spurred this group’s embrace of 
potent psychoactive drugs over alternative methods of treating mental illness.”).  
35 See Treatment and Services, NAT’L ALLIANCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/template.cfm?section=About_Treatments_and_Supports 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014 Sep. 23, 2014) (“Mental health medications . . . 
significantly improve symptoms and help promote recovery and are recognized 
as first-line treatment for most individuals.”). 
36 Kathleen Knepper, The Importance of Establishing Competence in Cases 
Involving the Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medications, 20 LAW 
& PSYCHOL. REV. 97, 98 (1996). 
37 See Lieberman et al., supra note 29, at 1218 (discussing how patients 
discontinue their antipsychotic drugs because of a lack of efficacy); see also 
Antipsychotics for Treating Schizophrenia, WEBMD, http://www.webmd 
.com/schizophrenia/first-generation-antipsychotics-for-treating-
schizophrenia#abk1290 (last modified August 31, 2012) (stating that the side 
effects of taking antipsychotics may include high cholesterol, high blood 
pressure, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, and agranulocytosis). 
38 MARIAN MCDONAGH ET AL., DRUG CLASS REVIEW: ATYPICAL 
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS: FINAL UPDATE 3 REPORT (3rd ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50583; Miranda Chakos et al., Second-
Generation Antipsychotics in Patients With Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenia: 
A Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomized Trials, 2 J. LIFELONG LEARNING 
PSYCHIATRY 111, 111 (2004).  
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moderately successful in reducing psychotic symptoms of high-
risk patients.39 A new class of antipsychotic drugs, dubbed the 
“second-generation,” was introduced in the 1990s in an attempt to 
both lower the side-effect problem and to offer greater efficacy in 
treating mental illness.40 These drugs differed from their 
predecessors based on “the timeline of their development, their 
pharmacology, and their adverse effects profiles.”41 Due in large 
part to these promises, one second-generation antipsychotic named 
Abilify had the highest sales of any medication in the United States 
in 2014.42 In 2011, 3.1 million Americans spent $18 billion on 
prescriptions for antipsychotics.43  
The use of conventional antipsychotics has been accompanied 
by disastrous side effects, including cardiac arrest and death.44 
Today, proponents of antipsychotic medication argue that these 
dire side effects and the drugs’ oft-reported ineffectiveness were 
simply characteristics of the older versions of these medications.45 
Considering the pervasive use of these drugs, and the companies’ 
                                                            
39 Schizophrenia Medications, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/ 
schizophrenia/guide/schizophrenia-medications (last reviewed February 20, 
2014). 
40 Stefan Leucht et al., A Meta-Analysis of Head-to-Head Comparisons of 
Second-Generation Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 166 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2009). 
41 First-Generation Versus Second-Generation Antipsychotics in Adults: 
Comparative Effectiveness, EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/search-for-
guides-reviews-and-reports/?pageaction=displayproduct&productID=1054 (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2014).   
42 Megan Brooks, Top 100 Most Prescribed, Top Selling Drugs, MEDSCAPE 
(May 13, 2014) available at http://www.medscape 
.com/viewarticle/825053. 
43 Richard A. Friedman, A Call for Caution on Antipsychotic Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sep. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/ 
health/a-call-for-caution-in-the-use-of-antipsychotic-drugs.html?_r=0. 
44 Serge Sicouri & Charles Antzelevitch, Sudden Cardiac Death Secondary 
to Antidepressant and Antipsychotic Drugs 4–5 (March 1, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with PubMed Central), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2365731/. 
45 United States v. Hardy, 724 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[F]irst-
generation injections…are ‘the group most likely to cause the more serious 
adverse effects’ . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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touting of their efficacy and minimal side effects, the lack of data 
regarding second-generation antipsychotics is surprising.46 The 
studies that have been published suggest that the “claims of 
superiority for the [newer drugs] were greatly exaggerated.”47 One 
recent study revealed that many second-generation antipsychotics 
“were not significantly different from first-generation 
antipsychotic drugs on overall symptoms.”48 Additionally, a study 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that 
“[c]urrent users of [first-generation] and of [second-generation] 
antipsychotic drugs had a similar, dose-related increased risk of 
sudden cardiac death.”49  
These studies reveal that the government, when it forces 
defendants to ingest antipsychotics, is knowingly exposing them to 
a real risk of significant side effects.50 This risk is coupled with the 
reality that there is no guarantee the drugs will be effective in 
carrying out their ultimate objective: rendering the defendant 
competent to stand trial.51 Despite the known risks, studies 
identifying these risks, and doubts about these drugs’ effectiveness, 
                                                            
46 David Fraguas, et al., Efficacy and safety of second-generation 
antipsychotics in children and adolescents with psychotic and bipolar spectrum 
disorders, 21 EUR. NEUROPYSCHOPHARMACOLOGY, 621, 642 (2011) (“More 
research is needed to evaluate mechanisms and predictors of antipsychotic 
efficacy . . . .”). 
47 Shankar Vedantam, In Antipsychotics, Newer Isn’t Better, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/ 
10/02/AR2006100201378.html (“The claims of superiority for the [newer drugs] 
were greatly exaggerated.”) (quoting Columbia University psychiatrist Jeffrey 
Lieberman). 
48 Stefan Leucht et al., Second–Generation Versus First–Generation 
Antipsychotic Drugs for Schizophrenia: a Meta–Analysis, 373 LANCET 31, 34 
(2009).  
49 Wayne A. Ray et al., Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs and the Risk of 
Sudden Cardiac Death, 360:3 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 225, 225 (2009). The 
majority in Sell even conceded that “[d]ifferent kinds of antipsychotic drugs 
may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.” Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).   
50 Assuming, optimistically, that the government is fully aware of the 
research discussed above. 
51 “The purpose of an order of involuntary medication is to restore a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.” Brief for the United States, Sell v. 
United States 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02–5664), 2003 WL 193605, at *37. 
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duplicitous marketing has convinced the Supreme Court and 
millions of Americans that antipsychotic medications are the 
panacea for mental illness. The Supreme Court thus signed off on 
the violation of the rights of non-violent defendants who suffer 
from mental illness in exchange for the mere possibility the drugs 
would increase the probability the defendant would become 
competent to stand trial.  
 
II.      COMPETENCY & THE LAW 
 
The government’s purpose in violating these defendants’ 
constitutional rights is to render them competent to stand trial. 
Competency traditionally entails “the ability to do something 
successfully or efficiently.”52 This Note focuses on defendants who 
are competent enough to make medical decisions, but have been 
deemed by a court of law to lack the competency to stand trial. 
That one could be competent to make medical decisions, but not to 
stand trial, may seem counterintuitive. Yet, competence “varies 
with time and with situation.”53 Thus, “[a] person may be 
competent to make some decisions but not others.”54 The 
commonly held belief that “competence is a fixed or stable state” 
has proved inaccurate.55 Consequently, a determination that a 
defendant is competent to make medical decisions does not 
automatically render such a person competent to stand trial as well. 
As a result of this fluidity, the legal community has struggled to 
determine a standard definition of competency as courts employ 
distinct language across various areas of the law—be they 
criminal, mental health law, etc.56 
                                                            
52 Competency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (Mar. 25, 2014 3:33 P.M.), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competency 
53 Norman G. Poythress & Patricia A. Zapf, Controversies in Evaluating 
Competence to Stand Trial, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: 
CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 309, 324 (Jennifer L. Skeem et al. eds. 2009). 
54 Rogers v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 313 
(Mass. 1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
55 Poythress & Zapf, supra note 53. 
56 MICHEAL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL 
THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION 1 (2008) (“Developments in very relevant 
areas of the law –  criminal law, mental disability law, private law –  have 
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Federal criminal law allows either party to file a motion to 
determine the defendant’s mental competency to stand trial at any 
point after a prosecution has commenced and before a defendant 
has been sentenced.57 The federal statute specifies that the court 
shall grant this motion if there is “reasonable cause to believe” the 
defendant is suffering from a mental disease rendering him unable 
to “understand the nature and consequences  of  the  proceedings  
against  him  or  to  assist properly in his defense.”58 The Supreme 
Court in Dusky v. United States essentially ratified this standard.59 
In Dusky, the Court held that a perfunctory mental exam was not 
sufficient to establish a criminal defendant’s competency to stand 
trial.60 A court must conduct a more extensive review in order to 
find a defendant competent. The court must determine that the 
defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether 
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”61 While this standard represents how a 
defendant may exhibit competence, neither the Supreme Court nor 
the legislature has defined exactly how a defendant regains 
competence after a finding that she lacks it.  
If a defendant is held to be incompetent, federal law requires 
the defendant to be transferred to the custody of the Attorney 
General.62 The Attorney General is then authorized to confine the 
defendant in an effort “to determine whether there is a substantial 
probability” that the defendant will regain competency.63 After “a 
reasonable amount of time, not to exceed four months,”64 the 
defendant must be brought before a court to decide if she is 
“presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of 
which her release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
                                                            
yielded multiple definitions and meanings of competency.”). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (a) (2014).   
58 Id. § 4241(a). 
59 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
60 Id.  
61 Id.   
62 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2014). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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another person or serious damage to property of another.”65 In the 
event that the defendant “no longer create[s]  a  substantial  risk  of  
bodily  injury  to  another person or serious damage to property of 
another,” she shall be released.66 Pursuant to the statute, when the 
defendant is no longer a danger, the government’s interest in 
confining her does not override her interest in freedom from 
incarceration. 
This subordination of the government’s interest makes Sell 
even more puzzling. According to Sell, when the Government 
attempts to forcibly medicate a defendant, the government’s 
interest in prosecution supersedes the non-violent defendant’s 
interest in freedom from the antipsychotic drugs.67 The Court is 
thus implying that a defendant’s right to freedom from being 
forcibly administered dangerous antipsychotic drugs is somehow 
less valuable than her right to freedom from incarceration. 
 
III.      THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS AGAINST FORCIBLE 
MEDICATION 
 
When the government compels a defendant to take 
antipsychotics, “[t]he needs of the individual, not the requirements 
of the prosecutor, must be paramount.”68 This section explores 
how forcible medication violates the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial and her liberty interest in being free from 
forcible medication.  
 
A. Antipsychotics Disrupt a Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial  
 
The right to a fair trial is essential for a criminal defendant. At 
its core, “[t]he idea of a fair trial is central . . . because without this 
one right, all others are at risk.”69 In light of this, the judicial 
system must place a high value not only on making sure the guilty 
are brought to justice, but also on ensuring fair proceedings along 
                                                            
65 Id. § 4246(a). 
66 Id. § 4246(e). 
67 Sell v. United States, 538 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
68 Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984). 
69 DAVID ROBERTSON, A DICTIONARY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (1997). 
 INSANE IN THE MEMBRANE 365 
the way.70 The Sixth Amendment requires that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation . . . and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”71 The Sixth Amendment 
exists to protect criminal defendants, as its “purpose and essential 
aim” is “providing effective advocacy and a fair trial.”72 
Antipsychotics affect a defendant’s mental state in such a manner 
as to obstruct her right to be cognizant of the crimes alleged, and to 
adequately consult with her counsel. Moreover, drugs may so 
negatively affect the outward demeanor of the defendant as to 
remove the possibility of the jury remaining “impartial.”73   
Antipsychotic drugs considerably impede this right to a fair 
trial.74 The Supreme Court in Sell declared that drugs may be 
forcibly administered if the trial court finds the medication “is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the 
fairness of the trial.”75 This requirement inadequately protects the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights for two reasons. First, the Sell 
holding is not fully informed regarding the true repercussions of 
forcible antipsychotics on a defendant’s ability to assist in her own 
defense. Specifically, the Court did not adequately evaluate the 
effect of these drugs on a defendant’s right to testify. This holding 
affects those defendants whose mental state is so depleted that they 
have already been deemed incompetent to stand trial.76 As a result, 
there is a serious risk that the compelled administration of 
                                                            
70 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“Society wins not only when 
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the 
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”). 
71 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
72 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 156 n.3 (2006) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(“Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect the 
defendant’s ability to obtain a fair trial as guaranteed under the Sixth 
Amendment.”). 
75 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
76 See id. at 171. 
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antipsychotic drugs, which may simply “mask” the psychosis,77 
will not have a strong enough impact on the defendant’s dwindling 
competency to render him “informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusations against [him].”78 Second, and more significantly, Sell 
fails to account for the defendant’s other Sixth Amendment rights 
that are put at risk when the government forcibly medicates him. 
For instance, the Sell standard does not require trial courts to weigh 
the risk that a jury may make impermissible inferences regarding 
the defendant’s guilt based on the defendant’s outward 
demeanor—a demeanor in all likelihood perverted by the side 
effects of antipsychotic drugs. The drugs forced on these non-
violent pre-trial defendants result in an impermissible restriction 
not only on their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, but also on 
their right to an impartial jury, and their right to testify.79 
 
 
 
1. Antipsychotics’ Effect on a Defendant’s Right to 
Assist in Her Own Defense 
 
The side effects of antipsychotic medication can have a 
tremendous impact on the defendant’s constitutional right to assist 
in her own defense.80 Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
consistently recognized the importance of a defendant’s 
involvement in her own trial.81 Even a century ago, courts were 
prohibited from trying a defendant who was “disabled . . . from 
intelligently making his defense.”82 In the eighteenth century, Sir 
William Blackstone remarked, “if a man in his sound memory 
                                                            
77 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., 
dissenting). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (“It is now 
established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to 
the court.”); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813 (1975) (“With few 
exceptions, each of the several States also accords a defendant the right to 
represent himself in any criminal case.”). 
82 Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911). 
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commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he 
becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not 
able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought.”83 
Today, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice 
Standards lists five decisions that a defendant must ultimately 
make after “full consultation with counsel.”84 Three of the more 
significant decisions are: “(i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to 
accept a plea agreement and (iii) whether to testify in his or her 
own behalf.”85 Medication may jeopardize a defendant’s ability to 
make all three of these essential decisions.  
Plea bargaining is vastly important to criminal defendants as 
more than 90% of criminal cases are disposed of by the defendant 
accepting a plea agreement.86 Critically, if a defendant is impaired 
as a result of antipsychotic drugs, she may not be truly cognizant 
of the implications of a plea decision. When a defendant enters into 
a plea agreement, she is pleading guilty to the crime charged. As a 
guilty plea “is itself a conviction,” the plea agreement authorizes 
the court to proceed to the sentencing phase.87 Thus, entering into a 
plea agreement requires that the defendant be aware of “the nature 
of each charge” she is pleading guilty to and “any maximum 
possible penalty” that may be imposed.88 Furthermore, the 
defendant must be cognizant of all the constitutional rights she is 
sacrificing by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial and 
the right to testify.89 Acceptance of a plea agreement is an 
extremely important decision that results in essential rights being 
relinquished. A forcibly medicated defendant may not truly know 
the repercussions of her decision.  
 Some defendants do in fact have success with antipsychotics 
                                                            
83 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (J.W Jones trans. 1823) 
(1765–1769), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/bla-402.htm. 
84 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 199 (3d 
ed. 1993). 
85 Id. at 200.  
86 NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST- 
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS; CASES AND MATERIALS 353 (3rd ed. 2008). 
87 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). 
88 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(G)–(H). 
89 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(F). 
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and likely regain true competence. The drugs are certainly 
effective for some people and some defendants. Thus, this Note 
does not argue that these drugs provide no value to society, when 
the choice to take them is voluntary. However, when a defendant is 
forcibly medicated with antipsychotics, there is also a distinct 
possibility her cognitive processes will be altered for the worse and 
thus will not be truly cognizant of the implications of entering into 
a plea. These drugs can cause defendants to suffer side effects such 
as memory loss, “catatonic-like” lethargy, and general 
unawareness of the events occurring around her.90 Antipsychotics 
affect thought, behavior, and perception in such significant ways 
that some patients “can barely function” after a dosage.91 Forcing a 
person who suffers from mental illness and who has been 
compelled to ingest such mind-altering drugs to accept, deny, or 
even negotiate a plea agreement is not only unjust, it is also 
incompatible with our criminal justice system.92 The unavoidable 
symptoms of these drugs are completely antithetical to the 
purposes of plea agreements, which are meant to avoid lengthy 
trials when a defendant has indeed committed a crime. But with a 
heavily medicated defendant, there is a serious risk that she will 
simply be incapable of both recognizing the rights she is 
sacrificing and understanding the profound ramifications of 
entering into the plea agreement, especially if she has not 
committed the crime alleged.  
Forcible medication also presents a risk that the defendant will 
not be able to effectively communicate with her counsel. The side 
effects from antipsychotics affect a defendant’s “ability to think 
                                                            
90 United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d. 947, 954 (6th Cir. 1998); Harrison 
B. & Therrien B., Abstract, Effect of Antipsychotic Medication Use on Memory 
in Patients with Alzheimer’s Disease, J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, June 2007,  
at 11 (2007) (“Patients who were taking antipsychotics scored significantly 
worse on a recent autobiographical memory measure compared with patients 
who were not taking antipsychotics.”). 
91 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143 (1992); see also Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990) (“While the therapeutic benefits of 
antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs can have 
serious, even fatal, side effects.”). 
92 Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J., 
dissenting). 
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and communicate” and thus to effectively articulate to her lawyer 
her opinions on the case.93 These side effects jeopardize the 
defendant’s constitutional right to have effective assistance of 
counsel.94 In his concurring opinion in Riggins, Justice Kennedy 
expressed fear that the side effects of antipsychotic medications 
may in effect render moot a defendant’s ability to assist her 
lawyer.95 The defendant in many instances is the only person in 
possession of the essential facts of her case, particularly when a 
defendant intends to use an alibi defense. In such a situation, “there 
may be circumstances lying in [her] private knowledge which 
would prove [her] innocent.”96 However, when the defendant is 
forcibly administered antipsychotics, there is a risk that she will 
not be able to take advantage of such outcome-determinative facts 
“because they are not known to persons who undertake [her] 
defense.”97 To make matters worse, the defendant must attempt to 
effectively relate these crucial facts to her counsel despite the 
extremely unpredictable effect these drugs may have on speech, 
thought, and memory.98 This is especially so considering “the 
drugs may affect the same individual differently each time they are 
administered.”99 A defendant’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel is at grave risk of being violated due to the drugs’ effect on 
her communicative abilities. 
Irrespective of any side effects the defendant may suffer, there 
is still a risk that she will not have regained enough competence to 
be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” as required 
by the Sixth Amendment.100 It is worth noting that these drugs are 
                                                            
93 Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393–94 (10th Cir. 1984). 
94 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
95 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In my view 
elementary protections against state intrusion require the State in every case to 
make a showing that there is no significant risk that the medication will impair 
or alter in any material way the defendant’s capacity or willingness to react to 
the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel.”). 
96 United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906). 
97 Id. 
98 Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit to Die: Drug–Induced Competency for the 
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149, 170 (1995). 
99 Id. 
100 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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forcibly administered to mentally ill defendants who have already 
been declared incompetent to stand trial. Each of these defendants 
has previously been found “unable to understand the proceedings 
against [her].”101 A handful of dissenting judges have voiced 
concern that a defendant who can only regain competency through 
medication is rendered merely “synthetically sane”—not truly 
competent—when drugs are administered.102 Even proponents of 
forcible medication do not argue that antipsychotic drugs cure 
mental illness—the goal of the drugs is simply to achieve “control 
of the symptoms of severe mental disorders, not the permanent 
removal of the causes of severe mental disorders.”103 Thus, the 
defendant still may be so mentally disabled as to not comprehend 
the gravity of her alleged crimes or the possible punishment that 
she will face. As Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit artfully noted 
in his dissent in Singleton v. Norris, the defendant is no more 
competent after receiving medication than she was before taking 
the medication.104 The only difference is that the mental illness is 
simply “mask[ed].”105 The medication may only result in the 
appearance of competence and not the actual ability to understand 
the proceedings or to be “informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation.”106 Underneath this medicated façade, the defendant 
remains incompetent to stand trial. 
 
2. Antipsychotics’ Effect on the Jury 
 
Forcible medication also presents a risk that the jury will draw 
                                                            
101 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2014). 
102 See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing the barbarity of executing a mentally ill 
individual); State v. Collins, 381 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. 1980) (Marcus, J., 
dissenting) (considering the defendant’s “synthetic sanity”). See also State v. 
Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 759 (La. 1992) (finding that antipsychotics “merely calm 
and mask the psychotic symptoms which usually return to debilitate the patient 
when medication is discontinued”). 
103 T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons 
with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 283, 304–05 (1997). 
104 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1030 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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impermissible inferences about the defendant’s mental state as a 
result of certain side effects, thus eliminating the possibility of a 
fair trial for the presumptively innocent defendant. Juries 
inevitably dissect the defendant—her demeanor, presence, and 
appearance—in all stages of a criminal trial.107 The jury scrutinizes 
everything the defendant does, or fails to do.108 These actions and 
omissions allow the jury to form an impression of the defendant, 
an “impression that can have a powerful influence on the outcome 
of the trial.”109 A jury’s guilty decision may hinge on perceptions 
of behavior resulting from these side effects.  
This is particularly disconcerting in the case of the medicated 
defendant who wishes to exercise her constitutional right to testify. 
It is common knowledge that a defendant’s behavior can have a 
significant impact on a jury’s ultimate decision. A defendant’s 
demeanor can be substantially affected by two common side 
effects of conventional antipsychotics: akinesia and akathisisa.110 
Akinesia “makes the defendant apathetic and unemotional,” while 
akathisisa makes her “agitated and restless.”111 In one study on the 
popular antipsychotic Risperidone, twenty-four percent of patients 
suffered from akathisisa.112  
A jury deciding to assess a defendant’s case not on the merits, 
but on the defendant’s medically-induced “outward appearance,” 
illustrates another way that forcible medication results in an 
impermissible restriction on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If 
the defendant suffers from akinesia, the jury may perceive her as 
apathetic, and surmise that she lacks any respect for the victim, the 
crime, or the judicial proceeding. A jury in a murder trial may 
                                                            
107 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (“It is a fundamental 
assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact observes the accused 
throughout the trial, while the accused is either on the stand or sitting at the 
defense table.”). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 John Muench & Ann M. Hamer, Adverse Effects of Antipsychotic 
Medications, 81:5 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 617, 619 (2010).  
111 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987). 
112 Saxena S., Wang D., Bystritsky A., Baxter L.R., Risperidone 
augmentation of SRI treatment for refractory obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
57(7) J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 303 (1996). 
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observe the defendant’s medically-induced demeanor and conclude 
the defendant has a “not at all perturbed, lackadaisical attitude;” in 
other words, that she cannot—or worse, refuses to—show any 
emotion.113 Thus, the jury may convict a defendant based on its 
desire to put an immoral and dangerous person in jail, rather than 
on the merits of the case.114 The jury may be tempted to conclude 
that the defendant’s lack of emotion makes it more probable that 
the defendant committed the crime. 
Conversely, if the defendant suffers from akathisisa, the jury 
may view her restless and agitated symptoms as signs of 
nervousness and consciousness of guilt. In this instance, the jury 
may be persuaded to resolve that the defendant’s restless nature 
makes it more likely that the defendant committed the crime. Either 
way, forcible medication of these antipsychotic drugs produces a 
“prejudicial negative demeanor in the defendant.”115 The jury may 
ultimately discredit the defendant’s testimony and convict her 
based on her altered appearance caused by these drugs. A trial at 
which a defendant is only able to exercise her constitutional right 
to testify in such a potentially prejudicial manner is hardly a fair 
trial by an impartial jury.116  
Antipsychotic medication can also have a profoundly negative 
impact on a defendant who is entering a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity (“NGRI”). For an NGRI defense to be 
successful, the defendant must prove he was “unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts” at the 
commission of the crime.117 However, antipsychotic drugs 
“tinker[] with the mental processes”118 and subsequently “produce 
                                                            
113 State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. 1960). 
114 Id. at 327 (Where a defendant took tranquilizing drugs before trial, 
finding a “reasonable probability” that “the attitude, appearance, and demeanor 
[of the defendant], as observed by the jury, ha[d] been substantially influenced 
or affected by circumstances over which he had no real control.”). 
115 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(quoting the brief of the American Psychiatric Association). 
116 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
117 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2014). 
118 Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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structural brain changes.”119 The goal of these drugs essentially “is 
to alter the chemical balance in [a patient’s] brain.”120 The 
alterations from these drugs increase the likelihood that the mental 
makeup of the defendant at trial will be significantly different from 
that at the commission of the crime.121 There is thus a risk that 
antipsychotic medication will “create misimpressions about the 
defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime.”122 Studies of juror 
behavior show that—unsurprisingly—a jury is more likely to 
acquit by reason of insanity a defendant who is manifesting signs 
of psychosis at trial, rather than a defendant who appears to be free 
of psychotic symptoms at trial.123 Such decision making does not 
bode well for the defendant who is sedated and suffering from 
akinesia.124 Forcible medication may affect the jury in such a 
way—by making the defendant appear too sedated, too nervous, or 
(in the case of an NGRI defense) not mentally incapacitated 
enough—as to remove the possibility of a fair trial.  
The side effects that can accompany antipsychotics may cause 
the defendant to lack the “requisite mental capacity”125 to assist 
counsel in her defense. Moreover, compelling defendants to ingest 
antipsychotics creates the risk that the jury will make 
impermissible inferences about the defendant, thus restricting the 
defendant’s right to testify and plead an NGRI defense. This risk 
                                                            
119 Paul J. Harrison, Review: the Neuropathological Effects of Antipsychotic 
Drugs, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH 87, 87–88 (1999), available at 
https://www.madinamerica.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/NeurolepticNeuro 
pathologyPHarrison.pdf. 
120 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 (1990). 
121 State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (S.C. 1978) (citing State v. Murphy, 
355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960)) (“[D]efendant was given tranquilizing drugs by the 
trusty and when he took the stand he was[] in marked contrast to his normal 
demeanor.”).   
122 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987). 
123 Stephen J. Morse, Involuntary Competence, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 311, 
319 (“Some empirical research demonstrates that juries that believe the 
defendant is manifesting psychotic symptoms at trial are more likely to acquit by 
reason of insanity than jurors who believe the defendant is free of symptoms at 
trial.”) (citation omitted). 
124 Id. at 319–20. 
125 Keith R. Cruise & Richard Rogers, An Analysis of Competency to Stand 
Trial: An Integration of Case Law and Clinical Knowledge, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & 
LAW, 35, 36 (1998). 
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places mentally ill defendants in a frightening position and 
threatens the virtues of the criminal justice system, in which a jury 
weighs evidence, not appearance. Given the significant 
implications for defendants’ rights, and considering the danger that 
antipsychotics may produce “synthetic sanity,” these “drugs may 
result in it being impossible for the State to fairly and accurately 
try [the defendant].”126  
 
 
 B.  Forcible Medication Violates a Defendant’s Right to 
Refuse Antipsychotic Drug 
 
 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution guarantee that criminal defendants will not be 
“deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”127 While 
the Government has broad power to maintain public safety 
especially in the exercise of the police power, the due process 
clause prohibits state action that violates liberty interests so 
“rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”128 The Supreme Court in Washington v. 
Harper held that incarcerated individuals have a substantial 
interest in freedom from forcible antipsychotics.129 However, the 
Court did not examine exactly what the nature of that liberty 
interest was. 
In Sell, the Court had the opportunity to clarify and solidify this 
liberty interest, but failed to seize it. The Court could have, for 
example, included this interest as one such factor that a court must 
assess before permitting forcible medication. Regardless of this 
omission, established jurisprudence dictates that criminal 
defendants who suffer from mental illness have a constitutional 
right to refuse antipsychotics. This right stems from both a liberty 
interest in making certain fundamental decisions without 
                                                            
126 Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1513 (D. Utah 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
127 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.    
128 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–26 (1937) (applying this due process analysis 
against the states).  
129 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–31 (1990). 
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intervention,130 and the right to bodily integrity.131 The government 
violates both of these when it forcibly medicates a defendant. The 
purpose of antipsychotics is “to alter the will and the mind of the 
subject;” the government’s compulsory administration of 
antipsychotics therefore “constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the 
most . . . fundamental sense.”132  
1. Forcible Medication Violates a Defendant’s 
Fundamental Liberty Interest in Making Important 
Decisions Without Intervention 
 
 Immanuel Kant once characterized “autonomous decision 
making in matters affecting the body and mind [as] one of the most 
valued liberties in civil society.”133 Kant was certainly not alone in 
his interpretation, as autonomy has long been a principle of 
political theory, philosophical discourse, and theological debate.134 
The political theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui declared that a 
person, “as a free and intelligent being,” should be able to carry out 
her own lives as she sees fit.135 Time and again, the Supreme Court 
has cemented autonomy in its constitutional jurisprudence.136 In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
right to personal privacy is a guaranteed right firmly rooted in 
tradition.137 The vital right to privacy encompasses an individual’s 
autonomy to “make certain kinds of decisions without Government 
interference.”138 This right to private autonomy is so important that 
                                                            
130 Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990); Ramie v. 
Hedwig Vil., Tex., 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1985).  
131 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). 
132 Harper, 494 U.S. at 237–38 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
133 Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis 
of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 284, 314–15 
(1992). 
134 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Harvard Classics ed., 1909) 
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135 1 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND 
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37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1715–53 (1992). 
137 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
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the Court is determined to offer it Constitutional protection, even 
though the due process clause provides it no direct textual 
support.139 The decision facing mentally ill criminal defendants—
whether or not to ingest antipsychotic drugs—is one such 
fundamental decision.140 
This notion of “choice”—a person’s choice to make certain 
fundamental decisions—has permeated Supreme Court opinions 
since 1897, when the Court held that the definition of liberty, as 
interpreted through due process, encompasses the right to choose 
one’s occupation.141 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court ruled that a 
person’s decision concerning whether or not to use contraceptives 
was of such magnitude that it “fundamentally affect[ed]” her 
life.142 The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey declared 
“matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”143 Justice Stevens elegantly conveyed the judiciary’s 
respect for a person’s choice in such fundamental matters when he 
noted that “it is far better to permit some individuals to make 
incorrect decisions than to deny all individuals the right to make 
decisions that have a profound effect upon their destiny.”144  
Criminal defendants have a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse antipsychotics because this decision is “intrinsically 
personal” and can “profoundly affect . . . development or life.”145  
The Court first acknowledged this “right to refuse” in the seminal 
Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health case, where 
                                                            
139 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578 (2003) (holding that the “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
. . . the full right to engage in [private] conduct without intervention of the 
government.”). 
140 See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980) 
(noting that forcible medication inhibits a defendant’s fundamental right to 
privacy).  
141 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). 
142 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
143 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennslyvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992).  
144 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 781 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
145 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 756 (La. 1992). 
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the Court held that the right to refuse medical care is 
constitutionally protected.146 The Cruzan Court noted “the right to 
refuse any medical treatment emerged from the doctrines of 
trespass and battery.”147 The Court followed Cruzan with 
Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the Court held that while 
people have a right to refuse medical treatment, this right does not 
extend to physician-assisted suicide.148 The Court distinguished 
assisted suicide from the right to refuse medical treatment on the 
grounds that the latter involves “the assistance of another” and thus 
does not enjoy the same constitutional protections.149 In the case of 
refusing forcible medication, there is no “other person” implicated; 
refusing antipsychotics is a personal choice made by the defendant, 
akin to the right to refuse medical treatment affirmed in Cruzan.150 
As “[t]he . . . individual privacy of the human body is obviously 
fundamental to liberty . . . [e]very violation of a person’s bodily 
integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty”; the criminal 
defendant faced with forcible medication has a fundamental right 
to refuse these drugs.151  
Forcible medication is such an invasion in part due to the 
catastrophic and “potentially permanent” side effects that come 
with it.152 Some of these “serious[,] direct, often debilitating, and 
unwanted side effects” can result in cardiac arrest or even death.153 
Another such permanent side effect is tardive dyskinesia.154 
Tardive dyskinesia “is a neurological disorder . . . that is 
characterized by involuntary, uncontrollable movements of various 
                                                            
146 Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
147 Id. at 305. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 
291, 294, n.4 (1982)). 
148 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724–28 (1997).  
149 Id. at 725. 
150 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. 
151 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
152 In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 231 (Cal. 2004). 
153 1 BRIAN CUTLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 325 
(2008). 
154 Tardive Dyskinesia, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., http://www.nlm. 
nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000685.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).  
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muscles, especially around the face.”155 According to a “fair 
reading of the evidence” by the Supreme Court, this disorder 
affects between ten and twenty-five percent of first-generation 
antipsychotic users.156  
Aside from neurological disorders, antipsychotic medications 
can have immediate physical ramifications as well, such as a 
significant loss of white blood cells.157 People with low white 
blood cell counts are more likely to contract serious infections; 
thus, when the state forces these medications upon defendants, it is 
effectively putting their health at serious risk.158 These drugs and 
their side effects can also cause lasting psychological trauma, 
including suicidal or homicidal thoughts.159 The psychological 
effects from these drugs are so pronounced that mentally ill 
defendants are routinely prescribed benztriopine, a “drug used to 
treat side effects generated by other drugs.”160 Ironically, the side 
effects of benztriopine may magnify the very side effects it is 
designed to treat. Benztriopine’s side effects include, non-
exclusively, such horrors as “confusion, disorientation, agitation, 
excitation, memory impairment, delusions . . . hallucinations . . . 
aggression or violent behavior, and suicidal tendencies.”161 As all 
of these side effects indicate, taking antipsychotics is a serious 
decision. These side effects are so severe that one scholar 
characterized them as “distortions [that] transform medication 
from a source of healing into a source of punishment that inflicts 
                                                            
155 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990) (citing Mills v. Rogers, 
457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982)); see also Tardive Dyskinesia, supra note 167. 
156 Harper, 494 U.S. at 230. 
157 Cichon, supra note 133, at 297–99.  
158 Low Blood Cell Counts: Side Effect Of Cancer Treatment, MAYO 
CLINIC (Sep.17, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/cancer-treatment/ 
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159 Cichon, supra note 133, at 302 (“An increasing body of recent medical 
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160 Benzotropine (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic. 
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updated Aug. 1, 2014). 
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acute psychological distress and suffering.”162  
Beyond the physical ramifications of antipsychotics, the drugs 
also “reset the brain’s chemical balance, and affect the way a 
person perceives and interacts with the world.”163 It is manifest 
that the decision to ingest such drugs is a fundamental choice 
because it is “central to [the defendant’s] personal dignity and 
autonomy.”164 It is the criminal defendant “who is the subject of 
[the] medical decision.”165 Thus, the defendant’s liberty interest in 
refusing such mind-changing antipsychotics must be given the 
utmost respect.  
 
2. Forcible Medication Violates a Defendant’s 
Fundamental Liberty Interest in Bodily Integrity  
 
The Supreme Court has suggested that the fundamental right to 
privacy includes “the right to bodily integrity”166—and also noted 
that “the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere 
with a person’s most basic decisions . . . about bodily integrity.”167 
When a defendant is compelled to ingest antipsychotics, his right 
to bodily integrity is violated. The origins of this right can be 
traced back as far as the thirteenth century, when the tort of battery 
came about as a safeguard for the “individual’s interest in bodily 
integrity.”168 It is because of this history that the title of the Second 
Chapter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is “Intentional 
Invasions of Interests in Personality.”169 In its seminal 1891 Union 
Pacific holding, the Supreme Court noted the “inviolability of a 
person,” the invasion of which was “an assault, [and] a 
                                                            
162 Michaela P. Sewall, Pushing Execution over the Constitutional Line: 
Forcible Medication of Condemned Inmates and the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1279, 1317 (2010). 
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trespass.”170 The Supreme Court has also demonstrated that the 
Fourth Amendment is an avenue through which the Constitution 
voices clear support for the right to bodily integrity.171 The text of 
the Fourth Amendment itself confirms this right to bodily integrity, 
as it protects “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons.”172 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment, in the eyes of 
the Supreme Court, is to “protect personal privacy . . . against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”173 As Judge Cardozo once 
famously opined, every person “has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body.”174  
It is obvious that criminal defendants do not enjoy the same 
right to bodily integrity as ordinary citizens who have yet to be 
charged with a crime. The Fourth Amendment details that “upon 
probable cause,” an ordinary citizen may be searched or seized, 
thus depriving the citizen of his ordinary sense of personal 
privacy.175 This starts a chain of events (that culminate in 
detention) that separate criminal defendants from the rest of 
society and inhibits their liberty interest in bodily integrity. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has enshrined the notion that a 
person is entitled to a liberty interest in bodily integrity, regardless 
of her status as a defendant.176 Winston v. Lee involved a criminal 
suspect who had refused a surgical operation to remove a bullet 
from his body that the government wanted to excise as a piece of 
“evidence.”177 Recognizing that the suspect’s “dignitary interests 
in personal privacy and bodily integrity” were at issue, the 
Supreme Court struck down the government’s attempt to compel 
                                                            
170 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891). 
171 See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); Winston v. Lee, 
470 U.S. 753, 760–61 (1985). 
172 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
173 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
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175 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
176 Winston, 470 U.S. at 759–67. 
177 Id. at 755.  
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the surgery.178 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that the Government may not “take control of respondent’s 
body, to drug this citizen . . . not yet convicted of a criminal 
offense.”179 However, in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
government from compelling a “driving while intoxicated” (DWI) 
suspect to take a blood test.180 However, the Court focused on the 
lack of any “risk, trauma or pain” involved in a blood test—unlike 
the major surgery at issue in Winston—when it rejected the 
petitioner’s claim.181 
The bodily intrusions that occur when defendants are forcibly 
medicated are similar to those found in Winston. Forcible 
medication involves a non-consensual procedure that invades a 
defendant’s right to bodily integrity and brings with it the 
possibility of severe side effects. Thus, the Court should have 
granted defendants similar protection as it afforded to Winston. To 
establish a true understanding of this violation of bodily integrity, 
the intrusiveness of forcible medication must be examined because 
“the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily 
invasion increases.”182  
To understand the nature of the invasion, it is worthwhile to 
analyze how forcible administration proceeds from the defendant’s 
point of view. The medical staff must, at times, go through great 
pains to force a defendant to ultimately ingest the drugs.183 A few 
times a month, as many as five nurses may enter the defendant’s 
area where he is kept and first, immobilize him.184 The nurses then 
restrain the defendant, and proceed to administer potentially 
                                                            
178 Id. at 761–66. 
179 Id. at 765–66 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“mind-altering drugs.”185 Nurses often have to “pull down [a 
defendant’s] pants and [insert] a needle in[to] [his] buttocks.”186 
The “physical violence inherent in forcible medication”187 results 
in a “substantial and degrading intrusion of the body.”188 
This forcible administration of antipsychotics is distinguishable 
from a minor procedure, like the blood test in Schmerber. In 
Schmerber, the defendant was free of “risk, trauma or pain.”189 
Moreover, blood tests are a routine procedure—many Americans 
subject to blood tests every day. The forced injection of mind-
altering drugs,, however, is not only rare, it is also painful. Forcible 
medication involves “strugg[ling] to open [the defendant’s] 
mouth” and shoving these drugs into his body.190 The 
administration of these drugs “illegally break[s] into the privacy” 
of the defendant, a practice “bound to offend even hardened 
sensibilities.”191 The physical intrusion inherent in forcibly 
medicating a defendant violates the defendant’s right to bodily 
integrity. As the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons 
argued in its brief supporting Dr. Sell, defendants who are “[n]ever 
found guilty of any crime and [who] pos[e] no threat to others” 
should not be compelled to endure “forced injection of mind-
altering drugs unlimited in quantity and type.”192 Yet, the method 
of administering these drugs is but one factor in the analysis. Even 
if the methods were to improve, say through an intravenous 
injection, there would still be a significant concern for the practice 
upheld in Sell. The defendant would still be subject to the 
dangerous (and sometimes permanent) side effects of the drugs, 
which inhibit his right to a fair trial, his right to bodily integrity, 
                                                            
185 United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
186 Green, supra note 183.  
187 White, 620 F.3d at 422 (Keenan, J., concurring). 
188 Id. 
189 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). 
190 Compare this forceful procedure with Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165 (1952).  There the Court held that “strugg[ling] to open [the defendant’s] 
mouth” and pump his stomach to get at drugs was an unconstitutional violation 
of due process. Id. at 172.  
191 Id. 
192 Brief for the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *2, Sell v. United States 539 U.S. 166 
(2003) (No. 02–5664). 
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and his right to make certain personal decisions. Moreover, to date, 
this Note found no available cases, studies or news on the use of 
intravenous forcible medication on criminal defendants.  
 
IV.     THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST IN A TRIAL DOES NOT 
OUTWEIGH THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT AGAINST FORCIBLE 
MEDICATION 
 
While forcible medication does infringe upon the defendant’s 
fundamental right to be free from unwanted antipsychotics and her 
constitutional right to a fair trial, these rights are “not absolute and 
must be balanced with the interests of the government.”193 Sell 
concluded that the precedents of Riggins and Harper controlled, 
and thus the forcible medication of a pre-trial defendant is 
permissible if the State presents “important governmental trial-
related interests.”194 While the Court did not define such interests, 
it declared that the “Government’s interest in . . . trial” is 
sufficiently important to justify forcible medication.195 Clearly, this 
was hardly a victory for those fighting for the rights of defendants 
suffering from mental illness. 
Sell relied on Harper and Riggins in formulating its analysis of 
the government’s trial-related interests in forcibly medicating a 
non-dangerous pre-trial detainee. However, Sell failed to account 
for two other significant government interests discussed in Harper 
and Riggins. First, Harper involved forcible medication of an 
inmate who had already been found guilty;196 thus the government 
had an interest in the correction of the inmate.197 The government 
has no such interest in pre-trial defendants whose guilt has not yet 
been determined. Second, both Harper and Riggins narrowly 
upheld the government’s ability to forcibly medicate only those 
convicted defendants who had been deemed a danger to themselves 
                                                            
193 United States v. Santonio, No. 2:00-CR-90C, 2001 WL 670932, at *2 
(D. Utah May 3, 2001). 
194 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
195 Id. at 180–81. 
196 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213–14 (1990). 
197 Alan Felthous, The Involuntary Medication of Jared Loughner and 
Pretrial Jail Detainees in Nonmedical Correctional Facilities, 40 J. AM. ACAD. 
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or others.198 In Riggins, the Court explicitly reflected upon the 
Harper decision, acknowledging this limitation. The Court noted 
that Harper stood for the proposition: 
Taking account of the unique circumstances of penal 
confinement, however, we determined that due 
process allows a mentally ill inmate to be treated 
involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs where there is 
a determination that ‘the inmate is dangerous to 
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s 
medical interest.’199 
Dr. Sell, on the other hand, was found not to be a danger to himself 
or others.200 Thus, the government could only purport to forcibly 
medicate Dr. Sell for the purpose of his regaining competency to 
proceed with a trial.201 Competency for trial is a significantly less 
important interest than the dangerousness issue that drove the 
court’s decisions in Riggins and Harper.202 The government’s duty 
to maintain the safety of its facilities from dangerous mentally ill 
defendants is a sufficiently important interest – enough to override 
a defendant’s rights against being forcibly medicated. The Court in 
Harper acknowledged such when it relied on “the needs of the 
institution” to justify involuntary medication.203 In the case of a 
dangerous convict, the government has an incentive to forcibly 
medicate in an effort to protect other people—prison staff and 
inmates. However, in the absence of dangerousness, the 
government’s interest simply becomes to secure a trial—an interest 
that is much less immediate and one that does not directly protect 
the safety of others. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Riggins 
                                                            
198 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992); Harper, 494 U.S. at 
227. 
199 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134–35 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 227). 
200 Sell, 539 U.S. at 174, 184.  The magistrate judge had found Dr. Sell to 
be dangerous. Id. at 174. The District Court held that this finding was clearly 
erroneous. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed this aspect of the District Court’s 
holding. Id. For the purpose of appeal, the Supreme Court, in turn, assumed that 
the Court of Appeals finding that Sell was not dangerous was correct. Id. at 184.  
201 Id. at 179. 
202 In Riggins, the defendant had murdered someone and reported to hear 
voices. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129. In Harper the defendant had a long history of 
psychiatric problems and had assaulted two nurses. Harper, 494 U.S. at 213–14. 
203 Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.  
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explicitly stated it was not setting “substantive standards for 
judging forced administration of such drugs in the trial or pretrial 
settings.”204 Thus, Sell’s reliance on Harper and Riggins was 
wholly misguided. Given the inefficacy of antipsychotics and the 
likelihood that they will not result in the defendant regaining 
competency205 (and thus his ability to stand trial),206 the 
government’s interest in a trial is simply never sufficient to 
override a non-violent defendant’s constitutional rights against 
forcible medication.  
For both convicted inmates and pretrial detainees, the 
government has a general interest in “maintaining institutional 
security and preserving internal order.”207 The moment a pretrial 
detainee is convicted, the government’s interest increases 
significantly.208 Thereafter, the government has an interest in the 
correction of the convicted inmate, a “legitimate aim[] of a 
criminal sentence imposed as punishment.”209 The government’s 
correctional interests include: punishment of the inmate, deterring 
the inmate from committing future crimes, and rehabilitation.210  
However, “the government’s interest is lesser in the pretrial 
context than in the post conviction, correctional context.”211 In the 
absence of a conviction, the government cannot claim any interest 
in correction. Pretrial detainees have “not been adjudged guilty of 
any crime,” and thus may not be deterred, punished, or 
rehabilitated “prior to an adjudication of guilt.”212 The Ninth 
Circuit recently summarized this reasoning nicely: “[p]enological 
considerations [such as] punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation 
                                                            
204 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. 
205 Bryon L. Herbel & Hans Selmach, Involuntary Medication Treatment 
for Competency Restoration of 22 Defendants With Delusional Disorder; 35 J. 
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206 See Lieberman et al., supra note 29, at 1218. 
207 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979). 
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have no relevance to detainees who have not been convicted of any 
crime.”213 Sell did not account for this important distinction when 
it analyzed the Government interest at stake.  
Sell also did not adequately consider the possibility that these 
defendants would ultimately be cleared of their alleged crimes, and 
only be detained pre-trial. The Court in Sell stated that if the 
defendant sustains a “lengthy confinement in an institution for the 
mentally ill . . . that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach 
to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious 
crime.”214 Here, the Court is referring to defendants who refuse to 
take the medication and are subsequently placed in civil 
confinement until they regain competency. The Court does not 
seem to identify the possibility that a defendant will regain 
competency without forcible medication, and be cleared of his 
alleged crimes. The Court’s choice of language—in words such as 
“confinement”215—implies that it was considering the forcible 
medication of defendants who had been convicted, and thus 
deserved punishment. Nevertheless, the Court deviated from its 
prior holdings, and extended the reasoning of Harper and Riggins 
to authorize forcible medication of non-dangerous pretrial 
detainees.216 With respect to pretrial detainees, the government’s 
interests are limited to: (1) “assur[ing] the detainees’ presence at 
trial” and (2) “maintain[ing] the security and order of the detention 
facility.”217 Pretrial detention “is only for safe custody, and not for 
punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the 
commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be [treated] with the 
utmost humanity.”218 There is a distinct difference in the 
government’s interests in these two stages, as pretrial defendants 
have not been convicted; there is no interest in correction and the 
defendant may even be cleared of the charges. 
Forcible medication for the sole purpose of regaining 
competency is a separate issue from the practice of forcible 
medication after a finding of dangerousness. The Court in Sell 
                                                            
213 Bull v. San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). 
214 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
215 Id.   
216 Id. at 179. 
217 Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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alluded to safety as one of the government’s purposes behind 
forcible medication when it declared protecting “the basic need for 
human security” a factor in weighing the importance of the 
government’s interest.219 However, for safety to be a legitimate 
Government interest in forcibly medicating a pretrial detainee, the 
detainee must pose some sort of danger. In Riggins and Harper, 
the Court held that forcible medication after a finding of danger 
was constitutional.220 The Government’s interest in containing 
dangerous persons is obvious, in order to “combat[] the danger 
posed by a person to both himself and others.”221 The safety of the 
public and prison facilities is an essential goal of the state’s police 
power.222 Forcibly medicating a violent, mentally ill defendant 
falls within this power, as there is a serious safety risk to both the 
defendant and to others in the prison. The Supreme Court has held 
that community safety concerns can, and routinely do, override 
individual constitutional rights.223 In the case of a dangerous 
pretrial detainee, the security of the penal institution is important; 
thus the decision to forcibly medicate is permissible.224 However, 
when the need to control a dangerous defendant no longer exists, 
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health, morals, or safety, and the general well-being of the community . . . .”). 
223 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28–29 (1905) (“This court has 
more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and 
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the 
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.’” (quoting Thorpe v. 
Rutland & B.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (Vt. 1854))). 
224 Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (“There are few cases in which the State’s 
interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is 
greater than in a prison environment, which, ‘by definition,’ is made up of 
persons with ‘a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often 
violent, conduct.” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)); Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[E]ven when an institutional restriction 
infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the 
practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison 
administration, safeguarding institutional security.”). 
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the only purpose behind forcible medication is assuring the 
defendant’s presence at trial.225 Thus, the Court’s reference to 
“protect[ing] . . . the basic human need for security”226 as a 
purpose behind forcibly medicating a non-dangerous defendant is 
misguided. 
In Sell, absent a finding that the defendant posed a danger to 
himself or others, the only government interest was in bringing 
him to trial.227 While this is a legitimate interest, the government 
also has an obligation to ensure a fair trial.228 As a result of the 
Government’s duty to seek justice, its “interest in . . . trial—unlike 
that of a private litigant—is necessarily tempered by its interest in 
the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases.”229 “The 
government’s interest is in a fair trial in which the accused’s guilt 
or innocence is correctly determined.”230 As noted in Part III, the 
side effects of antipsychotics risk jettisoning the possibility of a 
fair trial for the forcibly medicated defendant.231 Therefore, the 
government’s argument that forcible medication is justified by its 
interest in a trial is suspect, as the only trial would likely be unfair. 
Without a “reasonably accurate disposition of the criminal 
charges,”232 the Government’s interest in a trial is not enough to 
override the non-violent defendant’s constitutional rights.233  
                                                            
225 See Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 1998). 
226 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S 166, 180 (2003). 
227 Brief Amicus Curiae of The Rutherford Institute In Support of 
Petitioner, Sell, 539 U.S. 166 (No. 02-5664), 2002 WL 31898316, at * 13 (“The 
interest of the state is not in merely subjecting a person to the machination of the 
court system and achieving a verdict. The state itself, no less than the criminal 
Defendant, has an interest in a fair and impartial trial.”). 
228 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“Moreover, the Government has a concomitant, 
constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair 
one.”). 
229 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985). 
230 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493–94 (4th Cir. 1987); 
Woodland v. Angus 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1513 (D. Utah 1993) (“State’s interest is 
not in trying plaintiff under any circumstances, but in trying plaintiff fairly and 
accurately.”). 
231 See supra Part III.A. 
232 BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 
298 (1997). 
233 Charters, 829 F.2d at 494 (“[T]here is good reason to question whether 
the government’s interest in a fair trial will be well served by placing a heavily 
medicated defendant before a jury.”). 
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Moreover, the government’s interest in forcibly medicating 
these defendants depends on the medication having enough of a 
cognitive impact on the defendant as to render them competent for 
trial. However, the medical data behind the efficacy of 
antipsychotics are, at best, spotty.234 In one study conducted two 
years after Sell, seventy-four percent of patients stopped taking 
their antipsychotic medication within eighteen months, the 
majority of which was due to the medication’s inefficacy or 
because of “intolerable side effects” among other reasons.235 As 
the Fourth Circuit noted in U.S v. Charters, trial courts are in a 
position such that they will never be certain that these drugs will in 
fact cognitively impact the defendant sufficiently to declare her 
competent to stand trial.236 Because of this uncertainty, the 
government’s sole purpose in administering these medications—to 
ensure the defendant is brought to a fairly adjudicated trial—may 
never be attained. However, the forcible medication of a defendant 
violates her rights regardless of the drug’s efficacy. Due to the 
intrusive and sometimes permanent nature of the drugs’ side 
effects, even an acquittal “would not affect the deprivation of 
liberty that occurred.”237 In United States v. Evans, the District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia recognized that the 
defendant was not competent to stand trial. 238 When the 
government attempted to forcibly medicate Evans, he appealed to 
the Fourth Circuit, which then authorized forced medication for his 
schizophrenia.239 In a twist of fate, at the subsequent trial Evans 
was acquitted.240   
                                                            
234 Fraguas, supra note 46 (“More research is needed to evaluate 
mechanisms and predictors of antipsychotic efficacy.”). 
235 Lieberman et al., supra note 29, 1209. 
236 Charters, 829 F.2d at 493 (“The district court acknowledged that ‘there 
is no way of knowing’ whether the medication would render Charters 
competent.”).  
237 See U.S. v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing a 
similar deprivation of liberty when a defendant is unnecessarily forced to appear 
before a judge wearing leg shackles) opinion withdrawn on denial of reh’g, 480 
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2007). 
238 United States v. Evans, 427 F. Supp. 2d 696, 697 (W.D. Va. 2006). 
239 United States v. Evans, 199 Fed. Appx. 290, 291 (4th Cir. 2006). 
240 United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 418 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Judgment of Acquittal, at 1, United States v. Evans, No. 1:07CR00043 
(W.D.Va. Nov. 15, 2007)).  
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Evans’s situation is one that proponents of forcible medication 
may cite as a victory. Those in favor of forcible medication may 
point to Evans’s case and surmise that the drugs did exactly what 
they were supposed to do—make Evans “competent.” Moreover, 
one could argue that the drugs served their ultimate purpose—
Evans’s competency—while his rights went undisturbed. While 
Evans was forcibly medicated, the antipsychotics presumably 
affected neither his right to assistance of counsel, nor his right to 
have an unbiased jury determine his fate, as he was acquitted. 
Ultimately, Evans was cleared of all charges,241 so one might posit 
that there truly was no harm done in this case. This line of 
reasoning may conclude that the government had obtained its 
goal—a fair trial—while there was only a minimal violation of 
Evans’s rights, akin to the blood test in Schmerber. 
However, this argument ignores the most personal rights 
violated in forcible medication—the right to bodily integrity and 
the right to make certain fundamental decisions. The difference 
between these rights and the right to a fair trial is that forcible 
medication places the right to a fair trial at risk. There is a 
possibility that the jury may make impermissible inferences 
regarding the defendant’s outward appearance, while there is also a 
chance that the defendant will not be able to adequately assist in 
his own defense as a result of the medication. There are many 
factors that may prevent the defendant’s right to a fair trial from 
being violated—from the effect of the drugs themselves to the 
possibility the jury does not make any impermissible inferences.  
This is completely unlike the impact of forcible medication on 
the right to bodily integrity and the right to make fundamental 
decisions. The right to bodily integrity and the right to make 
fundamental decisions are not at risk simply as a result of forcible 
medication. The government automatically and immediately 
violates these rights when it forces a defendant to take 
antipsychotics against her will. The moment the government 
injects the defendant with these mind-altering drugs, it has violated 
these rights. A defendant’s right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment is, at that instant, damaged forever. Similarly, the 
                                                            
241 Id.  
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moment antipsychotic drugs enter the defendant’s body, her right 
to bodily integrity is lost.  
Additionally, there are ways to mitigate the effect of these 
drugs on a fair trial—for example, instructions to the jury to ignore 
the defendant’s demeanor. However, there is no way to mitigate 
the effect of these drugs on the defendant’s right to bodily integrity 
or on her right to make fundamental decisions. Once the 
medication has been forced on her, the violation has as well. Thus, 
even though Evans was acquitted of all charges, by that time that 
he had lost the fight, having “undergone forced medication—the 
very harm that he [sought] to avoid.”242 Considering the 
constitutional rights that forcible medication violates, the risk that 
the government will never even achieve its sole purpose becomes a 
significant factor that weighs against government intrusion into a 
defendant’s body. 
In the absence of any risk that a defendant poses a danger to 
herself or others, the government’s only interest in forcible 
medication is in securing a trial. When faced with balancing the 
constitutionality of this government interest against the defendant’s 
constitutional rights, the Sell Court erroneously relied on Harper 
and Riggins.243 The holdings in Harper and Riggins were limited 
to ratifying forcible medication after a finding of dangerousness, or 
to persons already convicted: neither of which applied to the Sell 
defendant.244 Given the inefficacy of these medications and the 
subsequent likelihood that they will fail to produce competency for 
the defendant,245 along with their aggregate—often permanent side 
effects246—the Government’s interest in a trial is not important 
enough to override the non-violent defendant’s constitutional right 
to a fair trial, to be free from bodily invasion, and to make certain 
fundamental decisions. 
 
                                                            
242 See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176–77 (2003). 
243 Id. at 179. 
244 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 
494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). 
245 See Lieberman et al., supra note 29, at 1209–10. 
246 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1035 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., 
dissenting). 
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V.     THE SELL TEST HAS PROVED UNWORKABLE FOR LOWER 
COURTS 
 
The repercussions of the landmark Sell ruling have led to more, 
not less, tolerance of forcible medication by trial courts for two 
reasons. First, the uncertainty surrounding Sell has led lower courts 
to rely more and more on questionable medical testimony. Second, 
Sell failed to provide any standard for how “serious” a defendant’s 
crime must be in order to subject him to forcible medication. 
Simply put, these ambiguities have not been resolved in favor of 
defendants. Together, these two problems demonstrate Sell’s 
inherent promotion of an increase in the use of forcible 
medication–yet another reason why it should be revisited. 
 
A. Reliance on Questionable Medical Testimony after Sell  
 
 Sell, in effect, left lower courts with the task of figuring out 
the messy specifics of its four-factor test.247 Because of this 
uncertainty, courts are now relying on government-funded medical 
experts more than ever in Sell-controlled cases, specifically in 
regard to whether the medication is “necessary to regain 
competence.”248 Medical experts who play such a substantial role 
in these cases not only make medical determinations—assessments 
obviously within their expertise—but also draw conclusions upon 
which courts impermissibly rely in making their legal 
determinations.249 In Sell, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it 
would be difficult for these medical experts to “try to balance 
harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal 
                                                            
247 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.  
248 See Karen Franklin, Loughner Case Shines Spotlight On Forced Meds 
Practices, IN THE NEWS: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY AND 
PSYCHOLOGY-LAW (July 10, 2011), http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot. 
com/2011/07/loughner-case-shines-spotlight-on.html (“’I defer to medical 
doctors,’ U.S. District Judge Larry A. Burns said at an emergency hearing 
requested by the defense. ‘I have no reason to disagree with doctors. I didn’t go 
to medical school.’”).  
249 Cf. People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (“We 
have indicated that the prosecution expert’s testimony was inadmissible since it 
impermissibly defined the meaning of legal terms the definition of which is the 
proper function of the court.”). 
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questions of trial fairness and competence.”250 While medical 
experts can certainly assess the effect of certain mental illnesses, 
they lack “the expertise to testify that the drug is necessary in order 
to maintain [the defendant’s] competence to stand trial.”251 These 
determinations “are legal policy decisions appropriately within the 
province of the judge.”252  
This increased reliance on experts has led to forcible 
medication being upheld in cases where the data does not indicate 
the medication will likely result in the defendant regaining 
competency.  In United States v. Ghane, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed a trial court ruling that the medication was “substantially 
likely to render Ghane competent to stand trial.”253 The trial court 
had authorized the forcible use of antipsychotics despite the 
testimony of four psychiatrists that “[n]inety percent of delusional 
disorder patients do not experience improvement with 
treatment.”254 A “glimmer of hope” that the defendant would 
regain competency was enough for the trial court to conclude the 
defendant could be forcibly medicated.255 The fact that defendants 
are being put through the horrors of forcible medication based on 
specious expert medical testimony downplays the significant 
constitutional violations inherent in this process and shows again 
why Sell must be revisited.  
 
B. “Serious” Crimes After Sell 
 
The Court in Sell held that for a criminal defendant to be 
forcibly medicated, a “serious crime” must be at issue.256 However, 
the Court did not provide a definition of what constituted a serious 
crime. As one lower court noted, the Court “has not defined which 
crimes are ‘serious,’ nor has it outlined considerations a court 
                                                            
250 Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. 
251 Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 709 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
252 Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 235 (2004). 
253 United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 2004). 
254 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Ghane, No. 03-00171-
01-CR-W-ODS, slip op. at *5 (D.Mo. Feb. 12, 2004)). 
255 Id.  
256 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
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should take into account when determining whether the crime 
involved is serious.”257 A month after Sell was decided, the 
government—in an effort to interpret the bounds of “serious 
crimes” rather loosely—attempted to forcibly medicate a defendant 
“charged with violating the terms and conditions of his supervised 
release imposed for his admitted commission of a Class A 
misdemeanor of Malicious Mischief—the defendant broke a glass 
door.”258 Despite the Court’s silence on consideration of a 
defendant’s prior history, lower courts have unilaterally decided to 
factor in a defendant’s “long criminal history” in assessing the 
seriousness of the crime charged.259 Because of the numerous 
unresolved issues from Sell that trial courts must rectify, the Sell 
ruling has resulted in more leniency for the government to forcibly 
medicate defendants, not less. These practices are in direct 
violation of Sell’s requirement that this practice occur only in 
“limited circumstances.”260  
 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
 
The Sell Court reached its decision in the halcyon days during 
which second-generation antipsychotics were seen as revolutionary 
breakthroughs for mental illness.261 The sense of faith in 
antipsychotics as true saviors of the mentally ill has subsided—
largely due to a consensus in the medical community of their 
inefficacy and danger.262 These drugs were the foundation of the 
Sell ruling, which permitted the government to violate the 
constitutional rights of non-violent defendants who suffer from 
mental illness. Just as the medical field has revisited the impact of 
                                                            
257 Ohio v. Hicks, No. 2011 CR 0683, 2011 WL 9348700, *2 (M.D.Fla. 
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Jeffrey Lieberman.”). 
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antipsychotics, so too should the Supreme Court with its Sell 
ruling.  
The Supreme Court in Sell simply did not go far enough in 
protecting the mentally ill from forcible medication. When a 
mentally ill defendant is not a danger to himself or anyone else, the 
government’s only purpose in forcible medication is to secure a 
trial against the defendant. Simply put, this is not a sufficiently 
important interest to overcome the rights of a non-dangerous pre-
trial detainee against forcible medication—the right to a fair trial, 
the right to be free from unwanted bodily intrusions, and the right 
to make certain fundamental, personal decisions. As the Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Charters so succinctly stated, 
“[al]though we do not intend to downplay the importance of the 
Government’s obvious interest in resolving the guilt or innocence 
of a particular defendant, the interest does not permit such a 
draconian invasion of the individual’s freedom.”263  
Moreover, Sell has not provided adequate guidance to trial 
courts and has led to the forcible medication of an increasing 
number of non-violent defendants. In the wake of Sell, lower 
courts have increasingly been relying on questionable medical 
expert testimony and have also been unclear as to how serious a 
defendant’s crime must be to allow for the possibility of forcible 
medication. As research has awoken the medical community to the 
damaging and potentially irreversible side effects of 
antipsychotics, as well as their ineffectiveness in achieving 
regained competency, it is time for Sell to be revisited, and the 
rights of mentally ill defendants to be truly protected. One can only 
hope that the Supreme Court is soon presented with an opportunity 
to revisit Sell and that this time the Court will do more than pay lip 
service to the constitutional rights of defendants suffering from 
mental illness.  
 
                                                            
263 U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Bee v. 
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[A]lthough the state 
undoubtedly has an interest in bringing to trial those accused of a crime, we 
question whether this interest could ever be deemed sufficiently compelling to 
outweigh a criminal defendant’s interest in not being forcibly medicated with 
antipsychotic drugs.”). 
